Dynamic Analysis of Budget Policy Rules in Japan

Koichi Futagami
futagami@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp

Kunihiko Konishi**
k.konishi.econ@gmail.com

* Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
** Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University

Papers in the Bank of Japan Working Paper Series are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and comments. Views expressed are those of authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank.

If you have any comment or question on the working paper series, please contact each author.

When making a copy or reproduction of the content for commercial purposes, please contact the Public Relations Department (post.prd8@boj.or.jp) at the Bank in advance to request permission. When making a copy or reproduction, the source, Bank of Japan Working Paper Series, should explicitly be credited.
Dynamic Analysis of Budget Policy Rules in Japan*

Koichi Futagami†  Kunihiko Konishi§

February 26, 2018

Abstract

We construct an endogenous growth model with public capital and endogenous labor supply and examine quantitatively the welfare effects of fiscal consolidation on the Japanese economy. We consider two modes of fiscal consolidation: the adjustment to a new lower target of the debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios. We find that the debt and deficit reduction rules based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts improve households' welfare. This improvement in households' welfare becomes large as the speed of fiscal consolidation rises. Further, reductions in the target debt-to-GDP or deficit-to-GDP ratio generate larger welfare gains. We also discuss the welfare effects of fiscal consolidation with tax increases and transfer payment decreases.

JEL classification: E62, H54, H60

Keywords: Fiscal consolidation, Endogenous growth, Welfare

*We would like to thank Shin-ichi Nishiyama, Kozo Ueda, and the seminar participants at the Seventh Joint Conference organized by the University of Tokyo Center for Advanced Research in Finance and the Bank of Japan Research and Statistics Department and Kobe Conference on Trade, Financial Integration and Economic Growth. Konishi’s research is partially supported by the Research Fellowship for Young Scientists of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) (No.16J09472). Any errors are our responsibility.

†Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN; e-mail: futagami@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp

‡Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Yoshida-honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, JAPAN; e-mail: k.konishi.econ@gmail.com

§Research Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).
1 Introduction

Japanese government debt has climbed to an unprecedented level in recent years. The gross debt-to-GDP ratio in Japan reached 219.3% in 2015, a figure much higher than that in some EU member states. For example, in 2015, the gross debt-to-GDP ratios in Greece, Italy, and Portugal were 183.9%, 159.6%, and 150.7%, respectively. Other EU member states and the United States also suffer from high debt-to-GDP ratios.

To address these challenges, countries aim to implement fiscal consolidation. For example, the Maastricht Treaty enforces EU member states to keep their government deficit-to-GDP ratios below 3% and their debt-to-GDP ratios below 60%. Moreover, the reduction rule is also introduced: the reformed Stability and Growth Pact states that EU members whose debt-to-GDP ratio is above the 60% threshold must reduce their ratios to 60% at an average rate of one-twentieth per year. In the United States, the 2013 Budget Resolution passed by the US House of Representatives\textsuperscript{1} states that the government must cut its expenditure to reduce the budget deficit from 9% of GDP to the pre-financial crisis level by 2022. Likewise, the Japanese government aimed to reduce its primary deficit to achieve a primary surplus by 2020 but abandoned this target.\textsuperscript{2} Thus, there are two ways of implementing fiscal consolidation: one is to target the budget deficit and the other is to target government debt. Our study focuses on these rules and compares their effects on the Japanese economy and its welfare. Furthermore, we pay attention to the speed of fiscal consolidation.

To conduct our analyses, we construct an endogenous growth model with public capital and endogenous labor supply. The engine of growth in our model is productive public capital as in Futagami et al. (1993) and Turnovsky (1997).\textsuperscript{3} In the model presented herein, public investment is financed not only by taxes on capital income, labor income, and households’ consumption but also by issuing government bonds. When implementing fiscal consolidation, we consider the following two policy rules: (i) the government adjusts the public debt-to-output ratio gradually to the target and (ii) the government adjusts the government budget deficit-to-output ratio gradually to the target. In this study, we refer to the former (latter) policy rule as the \textit{debt (deficit) policy rule}.

\textsuperscript{1}House Concurrent Resolution, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, House Report No. 112, March 2012.
\textsuperscript{2}Doi et al. (2011) study the sustainability of budget deficits of Japan and conclude that the Japanese government must raise tax rates and reduce expenditure. In addition, Arai and Ueda (2013) show that the Japanese government needs to achieve a primary surplus in the long run to ensure fiscal sustainability.
\textsuperscript{3}Papageorgiou (2012) considers a similar issue in the Greek economy, using a growth model with productive public capital; however, the author’s is not an endogenous growth model.
To implement fiscal consolidation, the government must create fiscal space. Of the various approaches to do this, we focus on the government reducing its expenditure (consumption and investment) under the debt and deficit policy rules. In the short run, when the government reduces its investment expenditure to pursue fiscal consolidation, economic growth slows. However, in the long run, a decline in the interest payments of the government can create sufficient fiscal space to raise public investment, which can stimulate economic growth and improve welfare. Because the IMF (2014) stresses the importance of investment in productive public capital, it is important to study the welfare effects of expenditure cuts under both the debt and the deficit policy rules.

To create fiscal space, the government can also adopt alternative policies such as tax increases and transfer payment reductions to households. If the government chooses tax increases, the distortionary effects can diminish welfare. If the government chooses transfer payment decreases, the budget constraint of households is tightened, which can lower welfare. However, although both these policies have negative welfare effects, the government might not have to reduce its consumption and investment expenditure to pursue fiscal consolidation. Thus, we consider the welfare effects of these two policies.

By using the above framework, we calibrate the model with Japanese data and find the following results:

(i) Under the debt and deficit policy rules, fiscal consolidation based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts improves welfare. In addition, the welfare gains become large as the speed of fiscal consolidation rises. Regarding the target, lowering the target debt-to-GDP or deficit-to-GDP ratio generates larger welfare gains. Comparing these two fiscal consolidation policies, the welfare gains under the debt policy rule are larger than those under the deficit policy rule.

In contrast to fiscal consolidation based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts, we obtain the following results:

(ii) When fiscal consolidation is pursued by conducting capital or labor income tax increases, both the debt and the deficit policy rules generate smaller welfare gains. In particular, capital income tax increases have sufficiently large negative welfare effects.

(iii) When fiscal consolidation is pursued by conducting consumption tax increases, the debt policy rule generates smaller welfare gains. On the other hand, the deficit policy rule
with sufficiently small (large) consumption tax increases generates larger (smaller) welfare gains. However, even in this case, the welfare gains under the debt policy rule are larger than those under the deficit policy rule.

(iv) When fiscal consolidation is pursued by conducting transfer payment reductions, both the debt and the deficit policy rules generate larger welfare gains.

(v) If we incorporate government consumption utility and households’ preference for government consumption is sufficiently high, fiscal consolidation pursued by conducting labor income or consumption tax increases can generate larger welfare gains.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant literature. Section 3 establishes the model. Section 4 investigates the debt policy rule based only on expenditure cuts. Section 5 examines the deficit policy rule based only on expenditure cuts. Section 6 analyzes the welfare effects with tax increases. Section 7 investigates the welfare effects with transfer payment reductions. Section 8 discusses some important issues. Section 9 concludes.

2 Related literature

Previous studies of fiscal sustainability and fiscal consolidation examine two kinds of policy rules. One is based on a rule that the government controls the primary surplus or budget deficit depending on some economic variables. The other is based on a rule that the government controls some policy instruments (e.g., tax rates) to attain the target government debt. The latter studies take account of the rule adopted by EU states or the United States. By contrast, the studies in the first group do not take any government debt targets into account.

The first group of studies includes the following. Greiner (2007, 2012) and Kamiguchi and Tamai (2012) examine the sustainability of government debt by using endogenous growth models with a representative infinitely lived agent and public capital (public spending). All these studies consider the rule that controls the following manner:

\[
\frac{PS_t}{Y_t} = \mu + \kappa z_t, \quad \mu \in \mathbb{R}, \quad \kappa > 0,
\]

where \(Y_t\), \(PS_t\), and \(z_t\) stand for GDP, the primary surplus, and the debt-to-GDP ratio, respectively. This rule states that the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP is a positive linear function
of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Greiner (2007, 2012) and Kamiguchi and Tamai (2012) show that an economy cannot keep its fiscal sustainability when \( \kappa \) is sufficiently small.

Bräuninger (2005) considers a similar issue based on an endogenous growth model of AK technology with overlapping generations. Yakita (2008a) also considers the same issue based on an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations and public capital. In their models, the issuance of government bonds is tied to a certain ratio to GDP (budget deficit ratio). The following represents this rule:

\[
B_{t+1} - B_t = \bar{d} Y_t, \quad \bar{d} > 0.
\]

Bräuninger (2005) shows that when the budget deficit ratio is under a certain threshold, fiscal deficits are sustainable. Yakita (2008a) shows that the government deficit is sustainable below the threshold of the initial government debt for an initial level of public capital. However, none of these studies considers any target government debt or deficit.

We next explain the second group. Coenen et al. (2008) use a New Keynesian model that has two regions (the United States and the EU). The government in their model has a target debt-to-GDP ratio in line with the Maastricht Treaty. It then adjusts its policy instruments (e.g., the ratio of government expenditure or tax rates) to attain the target; that is,

\[
 i_t - i^* = \phi \left( z_t - \bar{z} \right),
\]

where \( i_t \) represents the policy instrument used and \( i^* \) stands for a steady state of their system. \( \bar{z} \) stands for the target debt-to-GDP ratio. \( \phi \) is a positive (negative) constant when the instrument is a tax rate (government expenditure). This rule states that when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the target, the government raises tax rates or decreases the ratio of government expenditure to GDP. Coenen et al. (2008) show that this fiscal consolidation rule has short-run negative effects and long-run positive effects.

Forni et al. (2010) also use a New Keynesian model that has two regions and incorporate a similar rule to Coenen et al. (2008) as follows:

\[
\frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} = \left( \frac{z_t}{\bar{z}} \right)^{\phi_1} \left( \frac{z_t}{z_{t-1}} \right)^{\phi_2} \left( \frac{Y_t}{Y_{t-1}} \right)^{\phi_3},
\]

where \( \phi_i \ (i = 1, 2, 3) \) is a positive (negative) constant when the instrument is a tax rate (government expenditure). In contrast to Coenen et al. (2008), their policy rule includes that a change of GDP from the last period to the present period and a change of debt from the last period to
the present period affect the adjustment of the policy instruments. Moreover, the government adjusts its policy instruments against their values in the last period. They consider a specific case in which the policy rule makes debt reach the target in about 10 years. They then examine the welfare effects of reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio and show that when the government reduces the target debt-to-GDP ratio, simultaneous decreases in public expenditure and tax rates have significantly positive effects on welfare.

Cogan et al. (2013) use a similar model to Coenen et al. (2008). They consider the following rule:

$$\iota_t = \phi \left( z_t - \bar{z} \right), \quad \phi > 0,$$

where $\iota_t$ stands for the ratio of lump sum tax to GDP. Their analyses are based on the 2013 Budget Resolution in the United States and they show that this mode of fiscal consolidation raises GDP not only in the long run but also in the short run.

Hansen and İmrohoroglu (2016) use a standard neoclassical growth model and consider that the government starts to reduce transfer payment to households or increase tax revenues when the net debt-to-GDP ratio hits the threshold value (250%). Then, the government tries to reduce the ratio to 60%. They show that fiscal adjustment then becomes significantly large.

However, although the above-mentioned studies introduce targets, they do not consider the speed at which fiscal consolidation is adjusted. By contrast, Maebayashi et al. (2017) take account of the speed of adjustment of fiscal consolidation in the following manner:

$$\dot{z}_t = -\phi (z_t - \bar{z}), \quad \phi > 0.$$ 

They find that fiscal consolidation based on this rule improves welfare and that the improvement in welfare increases as the speed of fiscal consolidation rises. Moreover, they discuss the optimal target and show that the optimal debt-to-GDP ratio is lower than the EU target.

\[4\] Futagami et al. (2008) consider a similar rule to this; however, the variables in their model are denominated by private capital.

\[5\] Morimoto et al. (2017) examine the stability of a similar model to Maebayashi et al. (2017) in a small open economy framework and show that the economy can be unstable.
3 Model

3.1 Firms

There is a large number of identical firms, whose size is normalized to one. Firm \( j \) produces a single final good by using the production technology given by

\[
Y_{j,t} = AK_{j,t}^{\alpha}(h_t L_{j,t})^{1-\alpha} \quad (0 < \alpha < 1),
\]

where \( Y_{j,t} \) is the output level, \( K_{j,t} \) and \( L_{j,t} \) are private capital and labor inputs, respectively, and \( h_t \) is labor productivity. The profit maximization in competitive markets gives the following necessary conditions:

\[
R_t = \alpha A(K_{j,t}/L_{j,t})^{\alpha-1}h_t^{1-\alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad w_t = (1-\alpha)A(K_{j,t}/L_{j,t})^\alpha h_t^{1-\alpha},
\]

where \( R_t \) and \( w_t \) represent the rental price of capital and wage rate, respectively.

Following Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004), Yakita (2008b), and Maebayashi et al. (2017), we assume that aggregate private capital, \( K_t = \sum_j K_{j,t} \), and public capital, \( K_{g,t} \), positively affect labor productivity and specify

\[
h_t = K_t^{1-\epsilon}K_{g,t}^\epsilon \quad (0 < \epsilon < 1).
\]

Let us denote the aggregate labor input as \( L_t = \sum_j L_{j,t} \). In the equilibrium, \( K_{j,t}/L_{j,t} = K_t/L_t \) holds. Therefore, the aggregate output and factor prices can be written as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
Y_t &= Ak_{g,t}^{\beta}L_t^{1-\alpha}K_t, \\
R_t &= \alpha Ak_{g,t}^{\beta}L_t^{1-\alpha}, \\
w_t &= (1-\alpha)Ak_{g,t}^{\beta}L_t^{-\alpha}K_t,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( k_{g,t} \equiv K_{g,t}/K_t \) and \( \beta \equiv \epsilon(1-\alpha) \).

3.2 Households

We consider a representative household that has an infinite planning horizon and perfect foresight. The size of the population is normalized to one. The objective of the representative household is

\[
U_0 = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( \log C_t - \psi \frac{n_t^{1+\chi}}{1+\chi} \right) dt,
\]

where \( \rho > 0 \) is the subjective discount rate, \( C_t \) is consumption, and \( n_t \) is the time devoted to labor supply. \( \chi \) denotes the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor. We assume that each household has one unit of time endowment, and hence leisure time becomes
1 - n_t. The budget constraint of the household becomes

\[ \dot{K}_t + \dot{B}_t = (1 - \tau_k)(R_t - \delta_k)K_t + (1 - \tau_b)r_tB_t + (1 - \tau_n)w_t n_t - (1 + \tau_c)C_t + TR_t, \]

where \( \delta_k \) is the depreciation of private capital, \( r_t \) is the interest rate, \( B_t \) is outstanding government debt, and \( TR_t \) is transfers from the government. \( \tau_k, \tau_b, \tau_n, \) and \( \tau_c \) represent the capital income tax rate, bond income tax rate, labor income tax rate, and consumption tax rate. Here, we assume that \( \tau_k, \tau_b, \tau_n, \) and \( \tau_c \) are constant over time. Let us define \( W_t = K_t + B_t \). The no-arbitrage condition in the asset market is

\[ (1 - \tau_k)(R_t - \delta_k) = (1 - \tau_b)r_t. \]  

(3)

By using (3), the budget constraint of the household can be rewritten as follows:

\[ \dot{W}_t = (1 - \tau_k)(R_t - \delta_k)W_t + (1 - \tau_n)w_t n_t - (1 + \tau_c)C_t + TR_t. \]  

(4)

From the maximization problem of the household, we obtain

\[ \frac{1}{(1 + \tau_c)C_t} = \frac{\psi n_t^X}{(1 - \tau_n)w_t}, \]  

(5a)

\[ \frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} = (1 - \tau_k)(R_t - \delta_k) - \rho, \]  

(5b)

and the usual transversality condition, \( \lim_{t \to \infty} C_t^{-1} W_t e^{-\rho t} = 0 \).

### 3.3 Government

The budget constraint of the government is given by

\[ \dot{B}_t = r_tB_t + G_t + TR_t - [\tau_k(R_t - \delta_k)K_t + \tau_b r_t B_t + \tau_n w_t n_t + \tau_c C_t], \]  

(6)

where \( G_t \) is the sum of government consumption and government investment. The government must satisfy the NPG condition, \( \lim_{T \to \infty} B_T e^{-\int_0^T (1 - \tau_b) r_v dw} \leq 0 \). It allocates a constant proportion, \( \theta \in (0, 1) \), of \( G_t \) to investment in public capital, \( I_{g,t} \). Thus, the evolution of public capital is given by

\[ \dot{K}_{g,t} = I_{g,t} - \delta_g K_{g,t} = \theta G_t - \delta_g K_{g,t}, \]  

(7)
where $\delta_g$ is the depreciation of public capital. In the following analyses, we assume that government consumption, $(1-\theta)G_t$, does not affect any economic agents.\footnote{In Section 8.2, we modify this setting to allow government consumption to positively affect households’ utility.} Regarding transfer payment, we assume that the government spends a constant proportion, $\xi \in (0, 1)$, of households’ labor income, $w_t n_t$, on transfer payment. That is, the following holds:

$$TR_t = \xi w_t n_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

In this study, the government budget deficit is defined as

$$D_t \equiv r_t B_t + G_t + TR_t - [\tau_k(R_t - \delta_k)K_t + \eta r_t B_t + \tau_n w_t n_t + \tau_c C_t].$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

By using (6) and (9), we obtain $\dot{B}_t = D_t$.

### 4 Debt policy rule

We first assume that the government gradually adjusts the public debt-to-output ratio to the target and adopts the following rule:

$$\dot{z}_t = -\phi (z_t - \bar{z}),$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

where $z_t = B_t / Y_t$. $\bar{z}$ is the target of $z_t$ and $\phi > 0$ is the adjustment coefficient of the rule. In this study, we refer to the rule (10) as the debt policy rule. In Section 5, we consider the alternative policy rule: the government gradually adjusts the government budget deficit-to-output ratio to the target.

#### 4.1 Dynamic system

We consider the dynamic system of the economy. Because the population size is normalized to one, the labor market-clearing condition becomes $L_t = n_t$. The market-clearing condition for the final good is as follows:

$$Y_t = C_t + I_t + G_t,$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)
where $I_t$ is investment in private capital. Note that the evolution of private capital is given by 
\[
\dot{K}_t = AK_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha} - c_t - g_t - \delta_k,
\]  
(12)

where $c_t \equiv C_t/K_t$ and $g_t \equiv G_t/K_t$. By using (7) and (12), we obtain
\[
\dot{k}_{g,t} = \theta g_t - \delta_k g_{t,t} - \left( AK_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha} - c_t - g_t - \delta_k \right) k_{g,t}.
\]  
(13)

From (1c) and (5a), the relationship between consumption and labor supply is given by
\[
(1 + \tau_k) c_t = (1 + \tau_n) \left( 1 - \alpha \right) AK_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha} + \psi_{n\chi + \alpha} + \alpha \theta g_t - \delta_g.
\]  
(14)

By using (1b), (5b), (12), (13), and (14), we obtain
\[
(\chi + \alpha) \dot{n}_t = - \left( 1 - \tau_k \right) \left( \alpha AK_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right) + \rho
\]
\[
+ (1 - \beta) \left( AK_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha} - c_t - g_t - \delta_k \right) + \beta \left( \theta g_t - \delta_g \right).
\]  
(15)

Because the definition of $z_t$ yields $\dot{z}_t = \frac{\dot{B}_t}{Y_t} - z_t \frac{\dot{Y}_t}{Y_t}$, (1a) and (10) imply
\[
- \phi(z_t - \bar{z}) = \dot{B}_t Y_t - z_t \left[ \beta \frac{\dot{k}_{g,t}}{k_{g,t}} + (1 - \alpha) \frac{\dot{n}_t}{n_t} + \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} \right].
\]  
(16)

Here, from (1a), (1b), (1c), (3), (6), and (8), we obtain
\[
\frac{\dot{B}_t}{Y_t} = (1 - \tau_k) \left( \alpha AK_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right) z_t + \frac{g_t}{AK_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha}}
\]
\[
- \left[ \tau_k \left( \alpha - \frac{\delta_k}{AK_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha}} \right) + (\tau_n - \zeta)(1 - \alpha) + \frac{\tau_c t}{AK_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha}} \right].
\]  
(17)

Substituting (12), (13), (14), (15), and (17) into (16) and solving for $g_t$ leads to
\[
g_t = \frac{\Psi_1(k_{g,t}, n_t) - \Psi_2(k_{g,t}, n_t, z_t) - \phi(z_t - \bar{z}) Ak_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha} \Psi_3(k_{g,t}, n_t, z_t)}{1 + \frac{1}{x + \alpha} \left[ (1 - \beta) k_{g,t} - \beta \theta \right] z_t Ak_{g,t}^\beta t^{1-\alpha} \Psi_3(k_{g,t}, n_t, z_t)}.
\]  
(18)
The numerator on the right-hand side of (18) is composed of the following parts. \( \Psi_1(k_g,t,n_t) \equiv \tau_k \left( \alpha A k_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right) + (\tau_n - \xi)(1-\alpha)Ak_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} + \tau_c (1-\tau_n)(1-\alpha)Ak_g^\beta \),

\( \Psi_2(k_g,t,n_t,z_t) \equiv (1-\tau_k) \left( \alpha Ak_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right) Ak_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} z_t, \)

\( \Psi_3(k_g,t,n_t,z_t) \equiv \frac{(\chi + 1)(1-\beta)}{\chi + \alpha} Ak_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} z_t \left[ Ak_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - \frac{(1-\tau_n)(1-\alpha)Ak_g^\beta}{(1+\tau_c)\psi n_t^{\chi+\alpha}} - \delta_k \right] - \frac{1-\alpha}{\chi + \alpha} Ak_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} z_t \left[ (1-\tau_k) \left( \alpha Ak_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right) - \rho \right] - \frac{(\chi + 1)\beta}{\chi + \alpha} \delta_g Ak_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} z_t. \)

The numerator on the right-hand side of (18) is composed of the following parts. \( \Psi_1(k_g,t,n_t) \) represents tax revenue minus transfer payment. \( \Psi_2(k_g,t,n_t,z_t) \) represents the interest payments on public debt. \( -\phi(z_t - \bar{z})Ak_g^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} \) represents the government expenditure cuts undertaken to decrease public debt. If \( \phi \) is larger, these government expenditure cuts become larger in the short run. \( \Psi_3(k_g,t,n_t,z_t) \) is the term related to \( Y_t/Y_t \).

In the debt policy rule, (10), (13), (14), (15), and (18) characterize the dynamic system with respect to \( z_t, k_g,t, \) and \( n_t \).

### 4.2 Steady state

Next, we consider the steady state of the economy. In the steady state, \( z_t, k_g,t, \) and \( n_t \) become constant over time; that is, \( z_t = \bar{z}, k_g,t = k_g^*, \) and \( n_t = n^* \) hold. The asterisks represent the variables in the steady state. In addition, the steady-state growth rates must satisfy \( \gamma^* \equiv \left( \frac{k_g^*}{n^*} \right)^* = \left( \frac{\bar{z}}{n^*} \right)^* = \left( \frac{\bar{y}}{n^*} \right)^* = \frac{K_n^*}{K_g^*} \). By using (1b), (5b), (7), and (12), we obtain

\[
\gamma^* = \theta g^* - \delta_g, \tag{19a}
\]

\[
= A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - c^* - g^* - \delta_k, \tag{19b}
\]

\[
= (1 - \tau_k) \left[ \alpha A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right] - \rho. \tag{19c}
\]

(18) leads to

\[
g^* = \frac{\Psi_1(k_g^*, n^*) - \Psi_2(k_g^*, n^*, \bar{z}) + \Psi_3(k_g^*, n^*, \bar{z})}{1 + \frac{1}{\chi + \alpha} [ (1-\beta)k_g^* - \beta \theta ] \bar{z} A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha}}. \tag{20}
\]
(14), (19a), and (19b) yield

\[(1 + \frac{\theta}{k_g}) g^* - \delta_g = A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \frac{(1 - \tau_n)(1 - \alpha)A(k_g^*)^\beta}{(1 + \tau_c)\psi(n^*)^{\chi+\alpha}} - \delta_k. \quad (21)\]

By using (14), (19b), and (19c), we obtain

\[A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \frac{(1 - \tau_n)(1 - \alpha)A(k_g^*)^\beta}{(1 + \tau_c)\psi(n^*)^{\chi+\alpha}} - g^* - \delta_k = (1 - \tau_k) \left[ \alpha A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right] - \rho. \quad (22)\]

By substituting (20) into (21) and (22) and solving these equations, we can obtain the steady-state values \(k_g^*\) and \(n^*\). The rest of the steady-state values (\(c^*, \gamma^*,\) and \(g^*\)) are determined by (14), (19a), and (20). From these results, we can confirm that the value of \(\phi\) does not affect the steady-state values. However, the steady-state values depend on the value of \(\bar{z}\).

4.3 Calibration

In this subsection, we explain the calibration method. As shown by Chetty et al. (2012), the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 0.5. Because the Frisch elasticity of labor supply in this study is 1/\(\chi\), we adopt \(\chi = 2\). Following Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2016), the capital income share is set to 0.3783; that is, \(\alpha = 0.3783\). We employ \(\tau_k = 0.5189\) and \(\tau_n = 0.3324\), which are the latest values estimated in Gunji and Miyazaki (2011) for 2007.\(^7\) In addition, we adopt the same value of \(\tau_b\) as in Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2016); that is, \(\tau_b = 0.2\). The tax rate on consumption in Japan in 2017 was 8\%. Therefore, we set \(\tau_c = 0.08\). Regarding the depreciation rate of private capital, we adopt \(\delta_k = 0.0721\), which is set to be intermediate between the values of Fujiwara et al. (2005), Sugo and Ueda (2008), Nutahara (2015), and Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2016).\(^8\) The depreciation rate of public capital is set to \(\delta_g = 0.0448\) following Kato (2002).

According to the OECD Economic Outlook for 1980–2015 in Japan, the average ratio of the sum of government consumption and government investment to GDP is 0.2148 and the average ratio of government investment to GDP is 0.04985. From these values, the ratio of government investment to the sum of government consumption and government investment is 0.2320. Thus, we set \(\theta = 0.2320\). Regarding the elasticity of output with respect to public capital \(\beta\), we adopt \(\beta = 0.160\), which is the value estimated by Miyagawa et al. (2013). This yields \(\epsilon = 0.2574\).

\(^7\)We use the tax rate on labor incomes with social security premiums estimated by Gunji and Miyazaki (2011).

\(^8\)In Fujiwara et al. (2005), Sugo and Ueda (2008), and Nutahara (2015), \(\delta_k\) is set to 0.06. On the contrary, in Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2016), \(\delta_k\) is set to 0.0842.
From (1a), (1c), and (8), we obtain $TR_t/Y_t = \xi(1 - \alpha)$. In this study, transfer payment, $TR_t$, are assumed to be social security benefits, and the average ratio of social security benefits to GDP in 1980–2015 is 0.09136. To satisfy this, we set $\xi = 0.1469$.

To calibrate the remaining parameters $A$, $\rho$, and $\psi$, we use the following values on the Japanese economy from the OECD Economic Outlook: (i) the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2015 was 2.1927, (ii) the average growth rate in 1980–2015 was 0.02062, (iii) the average labor supply in 1980–2015 was 0.1875,\(^9\) and (iv) the average ratio of the sum of government consumption and government investment to GDP was 0.2148. To satisfy these values in the steady state, we obtain the following calibration values: $A = 1.5376$, $\rho = 0.02842$, and $\psi = 100.01$.\(^{10}\) Table 1 summarizes the parameter values.

Table 1

Given these parameter values, we calculate the steady-state values of the private consumption-to-GDP ratio and government budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. Table 2 compares these calculations with the Japanese data and shows that these values match well. Moreover, the value of $\rho = 0.02842$ matches well with the conventional value in the macroeconomic literature. In the following analyses, we use this steady state as a starting point.

Table 2 further shows that the steady-state values of the total tax revenue-to-GDP ratio and government interest payments-to-GDP ratio deviate from the Japanese data. In our model, from (3), the real interest rate is determined by the rate of return as private capital, which implies a higher real interest rate than the actual data. Thus, the steady-state value of the government interest payments-to-GDP ratio is about 10 percentage points higher than the Japanese data. To satisfy the government budget constraint, the steady-state value of the total tax revenue-to-GDP ratio is also about 12 percentage points higher than the Japanese data. As mentioned in footnote 11 of Maebayashi et al. (2017), “huge models that incorporate the capital market in the open economy and the exchange rates and other fiscal and monetary policies in each of the countries might be necessary.” Indeed, these factors are important when discussing the

---

\(^9\)In this study, we calculate labor supply in the following way:

$$(\text{labor supply}) = \frac{(\text{the number of employed persons})}{(\text{total population})} \times \frac{(\text{total hours worked in a year})}{14 \times 30 \times 12}$$

We assume that the discretionary hours available per day are 14 hours and that one month is 30 days. From the OECD Economic Outlook, the average ratio of the number of employed persons to the total population was 0.4980 and the average total hours worked in a year was 1897.305 hours in 1980–2015. By using these values, we can calculate the average value of labor supply.

\(^{10}\)From conditions (i)–(iv), we first calculate the value of $k^*_g$. Then, we calculate the values of $A$, $\rho$, and $\psi$. 

13
welfare effects of fiscal consolidation. However, huge models may obscure our main arguments. Therefore, in this study, we do not consider these factors.

Table 2

4.4 Transitional dynamics

To investigate the transitional dynamics, we assume that the economy is initially in the steady state as in the previous subsection. That is, the government sets $\bar{z} = 2.1927$ before the policy change. At time 0, the government reduces $\bar{z}$ unexpectedly and gradually adjusts $z_t$ to the new target of $\bar{z}$ following the rule (10). The economy exhibits transitional dynamics and converges to the new steady state. We examine these transitional dynamics by using the relaxation algorithm developed by Trimborn et al. (2008). As mentioned in the Introduction, because the Japanese government does not have a public debt target, the new target of $\bar{z}$ is set to 0.6 following the Stability and Growth Pact and Maastricht Treaty. In addition, we vary the values of $\phi \in \{0.01, 0.05, 0.1\}$. Figure 1 presents the results.

Figure 1

$I_{g.t}/Y_t$ initially falls and thereafter monotonically increases to the new steady-state level. At time 0, to reduce $z_t$, the government must improve the government deficit, which leads to a reduction in government investment. When $z_t$ decreases, the interest payments of the government decline, which implies that the government can raise its expenditure. In the long run, government investment is higher than that at the initial steady-state level.

Because households anticipate that the debt reduction raises the long-run growth rate, they break into their savings and increase their consumption at time 0, $C_0$. Whether the growth rate of $K_t$ initially rises or falls is determined by the initial jump in government expenditure and private consumption. Because the initial decline in government expenditure is sufficiently large, resources are reallocated to investment in $K_t$. Thus, the growth rate of $K_t$ initially rises. After the initial jump, the growth rate of $K_t$ falls and then rises, converging to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level.

---

11The MATLAB programs for the relaxation algorithm are available for free download at http://www.relaxation.uni-siegen.de.
12This is the “non-Keynesian effect” (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano 1990; Alesina and Ardagna 1998; Perotti 1999).
From (1b) and (5b), the growth rate of $C_t$ is given by

$$\dot{C}_t = (1 - \tau_k) \left( \alpha A_t^\beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right) - \rho.$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

$k_{g,t}$ first falls and then rises, converging to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level. Furthermore, $n_t$ initially falls and thereafter increases to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level. From these results, the growth rate of $C_t$ initially falls and thereafter increases to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level.

In the short and long run, the effect of the growth rate of $K_t$ is sufficiently large. After the initial jump, $C_t/K_t$ decreases to the new steady-state level. From (14), because the effect of $C_t/K_t$ is sufficiently large, the transitional path of $n_t$ begins to run in the opposite direction; that is, $n_t$ initially falls and thereafter increases to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level.

At the end of this subsection, we mention the effects of $\phi$. As in Section 4.2, $\phi$ does not affect the steady-state values; that is, the long-run effects do not depend on $\phi$. However, if $\phi$ is larger, the short-run government expenditure cuts become larger (see (18)). This enlarges the short-run effects of the other variables.

### 4.5 Welfare effects based only on expenditure cuts

Next, we examine the welfare effects under the debt policy rule. We define $\gamma_t^C$ as the growth rate of $C_t$. Because $C_t = C_0 \exp \left( \int_0^t \gamma_s^C ds \right)$ and $c_t = C_t/K_t$ hold, we obtain

$$\log C_t = \log c_0 + \log K_0 + \int_0^t \gamma_s^C ds.$$  \hspace{1cm} (24)

Without any loss of generality, we set $K_0 = 1$. From (2) and (24), we obtain

$$U_0 = \frac{1}{\rho} \log c_0 + \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( \int_0^t \gamma_s^C ds - \psi n_t^{1+\chi} \right) dt.$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)

The welfare level can be calculated by $c_0$ and the transitional paths of $\gamma_t^C$ and $n_t$. Here, $U_{ini}$ is defined as the welfare level at which the economy remains in the initial steady state. By using
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Japanese government aimed to achieve a primary surplus by 2020. Based on this policy objective, it might be better to choose the primary deficit (surplus) as a target variable. However, if the government chooses this, the economy cannot keep its fiscal sustainability (see Greiner, 2007, 2012; Kamiguchi and Tamai, 2012).

\[ U_{ini} = \frac{1}{\rho} \left[ \log c_{ini}^{*} - \psi \left( \frac{n_{ini}^{*}}{1+\chi} \right)^{1+\chi} \right] + \frac{1}{\rho^2} \gamma_{ini}^{*}, \]

where \( c_{ini}^{*}, n_{ini}^{*}, \) and \( \gamma_{ini}^{*} \) represent the initial steady-state values of \( c_t, n_t, \) and the growth rate. We define \( U_{ini}^{**} \) as the welfare level after the policy change. In Appendix A, we present the calculation procedure for \( U_{ini}^{**} \) under the relaxation algorithm developed by Trimborn et al. (2008). The welfare gains (losses) of the policy change are measured by \[ \Delta U_0 = \frac{U_0^{**} - U_{ini}^{**}}{|U_{ini}^{**}|}. \]

Table 3 shows the results of our welfare analysis under the same scenario as in Section 4.4.

### Table 3

From (25) and \( K_0 = 1 \), the welfare level, \( U_0^{**} \), depends on \( C_0 \) and the transitional paths of \( \gamma_t^C \) and \( n_t \). As shown in Figure 1, the welfare effects of the policy change are as follows. \( c_0 \) positively affects \( U_0^{**} \). In the short (long) run, \( \gamma_t^C \) negatively (positively) impacts on \( U_0^{**} \). On the contrary, in the short (long) run, \( n_t \) positively (negatively) impacts on \( U_0^{**} \). As shown in Table 3, the positive welfare effects are sufficiently large; that is, a reduction in \( \bar{z} \) to 60% improves welfare. Table 3 shows that the welfare gains increase as \( \phi \) rises. Because \( \phi \) does not affect the steady-state values, the short-run positive welfare effects are crucial to the welfare level.

## 5 Deficit policy rule

Thus far, we have examined the debt policy rule. In this section, we assume that the government gradually adjusts the government budget deficit-to-output ratio to the target and adopts the following rule:

\[ \dot{d}_t = -\phi(d_t - \bar{d}), \]

where \( d_t \equiv D_t/Y_t \) and \( \bar{d} \) is the target of \( d_t \). In this study, we refer to the rule (26) as the *deficit policy rule*.\(^{13} \)

\(^{13}\)As mentioned in the Introduction, the Japanese government aimed to achieve a primary surplus by 2020. Based on this policy objective, it might be better to choose the primary deficit (surplus) as a target variable. However, if the government chooses this, the economy cannot keep its fiscal sustainability (see Greiner, 2007, 2012; Kamiguchi and Tamai, 2012).
5.1 Dynamic system

Even under the deficit policy rule, (13), (14), and (15) hold. Then, we consider the government sector. (1a), (12), and \[ \dot{B}_t = D_t \] yield

\[
\dot{b}_t = d_t A_k \beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - \left( A_k \beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - c_t - g_t - \delta_k \right) b_t, \tag{27}
\]

where \( b_t \equiv B_t / K_t \). Substituting (1b), (1c), (3), and (8) into (9) and solving for \( g_t \) leads to

\[
g_t = d_t A_k \beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - \left( \alpha A_k \beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right) b_t \\
+ \tau_k \left( \alpha A_k \beta n_t^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right) (1 + b_t) + (\tau_n - \xi)(1 - \alpha)A_k \beta n_t^{1-\alpha} + \tau c_t. \tag{28}
\]

\( g_t \) is determined by the following components. The first term represents government borrowing. The second term represents the interest payment on government debt. The rest represent tax revenue minus transfer payment. In contrast to the debt policy rule, \( g_t \) is not directly affected by the value of \( \phi \). As shown in the analysis below, the short-run effects of the deficit policy rule are smaller than those of the debt policy rule when \( \phi \) is large.

In the deficit policy rule, the government adjusts the level of \( d_t \) according to the rule (26). However, at time 0, the government can freely choose a combination of \( g_0 \) and \( d_0 \) to satisfy the budget constraint (28). This leads to equilibrium indeterminacy. Therefore, to avoid this problem, we impose the following assumption.

**Assumption 1.** Under the deficit policy rule (26), \( d_t \) is a predetermined variable.

As a result, (13), (14), (15), (26), (27), and (28) characterize the dynamic system with respect to \( d_t, k_{g,t}, b_t, \) and \( n_t \) in the deficit policy rule.

5.2 Steady state

In the steady state, \( d_t, k_{g,t}, b_t, \) and \( n_t \) become constant over time; that is, \( d_t = \bar{d}, k_{g,t} = k_{g}^*, \)

\( b_t = b^*, \) and \( n_t = n^* \) hold. In addition, the steady-state growth rates must satisfy \( \gamma^* = \left( \frac{\bar{K}_t}{K_t} \right)^* = \)
\((\frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t})^* = \left(\frac{\dot{B}_t}{B_t}\right)^* = \left(\frac{K_{g,t}}{K_{g,t}}\right)^*\). By using (1b), (5b), (7), (12), and \(\dot{B}_t = D_t\), we obtain

\[
\gamma^* = \theta g^* - \delta_g, \quad (29a)
\]

\[
= A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - c^* - g^* - \delta_k, \quad (29b)
\]

\[
= d \frac{A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha}}{b^*}, \quad (29c)
\]

\[
= (1 - \tau_k) \left[ \alpha A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right] - \rho. \quad (29d)
\]

(29c) and (29d) lead to

\[
b^* = \frac{\bar{d} A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha}}{(1 - \tau_k) \left[ \alpha A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right] - \rho}. \quad (30)
\]

From (14), (28), and (30), we obtain

\[
g^* = \left[ \bar{d} + (1 - \alpha)(\tau_n - \xi) \right] A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} + \frac{\tau_c}{1 + \tau_c} \frac{(1 - \tau_n)(1 - \alpha)A(k_g^*)^\beta}{\psi(n^*)^\chi^\alpha} + \left[ \alpha A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right] \left\{ \frac{(1 - \tau_k)\bar{d} A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha}}{(1 - \tau_k) \left[ \alpha A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right] - \rho} \right\}. \quad (31)
\]

(14), (29a), and (29b) yield

\[
\left(1 + \frac{\theta}{k_g^*}\right) g^* - \delta_g = A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \frac{(1 - \tau_n)(1 - \alpha)A(k_g^*)^\beta}{(1 + \tau_c)\psi(n^*)^\chi^\alpha} - \delta_k. \quad (32)
\]

By using (14), (29b), and (29d), we obtain

\[
A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \frac{(1 - \tau_n)(1 - \alpha)A(k_g^*)^\beta}{(1 + \tau_c)\psi(n^*)^\chi^\alpha} - g^* - \delta_k = (1 - \tau_k) \left[ \alpha A(k_g^*)^\beta (n^*)^{1-\alpha} - \delta_k \right] - \rho. \quad (33)
\]

By substituting (31) into (32) and (33) and solving these equations, we can obtain the steady-state values \(k_g^*\) and \(n^*\). The remaining steady-state values \((c^*, \gamma^*, b^*, \text{and} g^*)\) are determined by (14), (29a), (30), and (31). Similarly to the debt policy rule, the value of \(\phi\) does not affect the steady-state values and the steady-state values depend on the value of \(\bar{d}\).
5.3 Parameter values

We employ the same parameter values as in Table 2: \((\alpha, A, \epsilon, \chi, \rho, \psi, \theta, \xi, \tau_k, \tau_b, \tau_n, \tau_c, \delta_k, \delta_g) = (0.3783, 1.5376, 0.2574, 2, 0.02824, 100.01, 0.2320, 0.1469, 0.5189, 0.2, 0.3324, 0.08, 0.0721, 0.0448)\). Given these parameter values, we set \(\bar{d}\) to 0.04521 initially. Under this value, the initial steady state of the deficit policy rule coincides with that of the debt policy rule described in Section 4.3. In the following analyses, we use this steady state as a starting point.

5.4 Transitional dynamics

To investigate the transitional dynamics, we conduct a similar analysis to in Section 4.4. We assume that the economy is initially in the steady state. That is, the government sets \(\bar{d}\) to 0.04521 initially. At time 0, the government reduces \(\bar{d}\) unexpectedly and gradually adjusts \(d_t\) to the new target of \(\bar{d}\) following the rule (26). The new target of \(\bar{d}\) is set to 0.01467. Under this new target, the new steady state of the deficit policy rule coincides with that of the debt policy rule described in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. In addition, we vary the values of \(\phi\). Figure 2 presents the results.

[Figure 2]

From Assumption 1 and (28), government expenditure at time 0 depends only on the initial jump in \(n_t\). Hence, the initial jump in \(I_{g,t}/Y_t\) is sufficiently small. Then, to reduce \(d_t\) according to the rule (26), the government must decrease its expenditure. Thus, \(I_{g,t}/Y_t\) first falls. Because a decrease in \(B_t/Y_t\) reduces the interest payment of the government, the government can raise its expenditure; that is, \(I_{g,t}/Y_t\) increases to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level.

Because households anticipate that the deficit reduction raises the long-run growth rate, they break into their savings and increase their consumption at time 0, \(C_0\). From (14), \(n_t\) initially falls. As a result of the resource reallocation, the growth rate of \(K_t\) initially declines. After the policy change, the growth rate of \(K_t\) converges to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level.

As in (23), the growth rate of \(C_t\) is determined by the values of \(k_{g,t}\) and \(n_t\). \(k_{g,t}\) first falls and then rises, converging to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level. Furthermore, \(n_t\) initially falls and thereafter increases to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level. From these results, the growth rate of \(C_t\)
initially falls and thereafter increases to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level.

In the short (long) run, the growth rate of $K_t$ is lower (higher) than that of $C_t$. Therefore, $C_t/K_t$ first rises and then falls, converging to the new steady-state level, which is lower than the initial steady-state level. From (14), because the effect of $C_t/K_t$ is sufficiently large, the transitional path of $n_t$ begins to run in the opposite direction; that is, $n_t$ first falls and thereafter increases to the new steady-state level, which is higher than the initial steady-state level.

Similarly to the debt policy rule in Section 4.4, the long-run effects do not depend on $\phi$, while the short-run effects become large as $\phi$ increases. However, compared with the debt policy rule, the deficit policy rule has the following two properties. First, the initial changes are modest because $g_t$ is not directly affected by the value of $\phi$ (see (28)). Second, it takes a long time to converge to the new steady state. As in the analyses below, these properties mitigate the welfare gains under the deficit policy rule.

5.5 Welfare effects based only on expenditure cuts

In this subsection, we investigate the welfare effects under the deficit policy rule based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts. By using the same method as in Section 4.5, we calculate the welfare gains (losses) of the policy change, \( \Delta U_0 = (U_0^* - U_{ini})/|U_{ini}| \). Table 4 shows the results of our welfare analysis under the same scenario as in Section 5.4.

From (25), the welfare level, $U_0^*$, depends on $c_0$ and the transitional paths of $\gamma^C$ and $n_t$. As shown in Figure 2, the welfare effects of the policy change are as follows. $c_0$ positively affects $U_0^{**}$. In the short (long) run, $\gamma^C$ negatively (positively) impacts on $U_0^{**}$. On the contrary, in the short (long) run, $n_t$ positively (negatively) impacts on $U_0^{**}$. As shown in Table 4, the positive welfare effects exceed the negative welfare effects; that is, reductions in $\bar{d}$ improve welfare. Table 4 further shows that the welfare gains increase as $\phi$ rises.

The welfare effects under the deficit policy rule are similar to those under the debt policy rule. However, the welfare gains under the deficit policy rule are sufficiently small compared with those under the debt policy rule. From the discussion in the last paragraph of Section 5.4, because the initial changes are modest, the positive welfare effects of $c_0$ and $n_t$ are sufficiently
small. Moreover, it takes a long time to attain higher $\gamma_t^C$; that is, the long-run positive welfare effect of $\gamma_t^C$ is sufficiently small.

6 Welfare effects with tax increases

In the analyses of Sections 4 and 5, the government must decrease its expenditure to pursue fiscal consolidation. As mentioned in the Introduction, we then investigate the welfare effects with tax increases. Under the debt (deficit) policy rule, we consider the following scenario. The economy is initially in the steady state described in Section 4.3 (5.3). At time 0, the government reduces $\bar{z}$ ($\bar{d}$) and raises only one tax rate unexpectedly. After this policy change, the tax rate remains unchanged. Note that if tax increases are not sufficient to pursue fiscal consolidation, the government reduces its expenditure. The new target of $\bar{z}$ ($\bar{d}$) is set to 0.6 (0.01467) and the value of $\phi$ is set to 0.05.

6.1 Debt policy rule

Figure 3 shows the results of the transitional paths under the debt policy rule with tax increases. The left panels of Figure 3 correspond to the case in which the government increases only the capital income tax rate. Here, $\Delta \tau$ denotes increases in the rates of each tax. Moreover, the center (right) panels of Figure 3 correspond to the case in which the government increases only the tax rate on labor income (consumption).

[Figure 3]

Compared with the case of $\Delta \tau = 0$, for all taxes, increases in the tax rate mitigate the initial decline in $I_{g,t}/Y_t$ and raise $I_{g,t}/Y_t$ during the transitional paths. When $\tau_k$ rises, the growth rates of $K_t$ and $C_t$ decrease compared with the case of $\Delta \tau = 0$. An increase in $\tau_k$ diminishes households’ savings. On the contrary, the effects of increases in $\tau_n$ or $\tau_c$ on the growth rates of $K_t$ and $C_t$ are sufficiently small. Regarding the initial jump in private consumption, the effect of increases in $\tau_k$ on $C_0$ is modest. However, when $\tau_n$ or $\tau_c$ rises, the increases in $C_0$ become small. For all taxes, the effects of tax increases on $n_t$ are sufficiently small.

Table 5 represents the welfare effects under the debt policy rule with tax increases. In all cases, the welfare gains of reductions in $\bar{z}$ based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts are larger than those with tax increases. Furthermore, Table 5 shows that sufficiently low $\phi$ and sufficiently large $\tau_k$ increases lead to welfare losses. From
Figure 3, when $\tau_k$ increases, the growth rate of $C_t$ falls. This has a sufficiently large negative welfare effect. When $\tau_n$ or $\tau_c$ increases, the rises in $C_0$ become small, which has a negative welfare effect.

6.2 Deficit policy rule

In this subsection, we examine the welfare effects under the deficit policy rule with tax increases. Figure 4 presents the results of the transitional paths. Compared with the case of $\Delta \tau = 0$, increases in $\tau_n$ or $\tau_c$ raise $I_{g,t}/Y_t$ in the short and long run, whereas increases in $\tau_k$ raise the short-run values of $I_{g,t}/Y_t$ but do not seriously affect the long-run values of $I_{g,t}/Y_t$. When $\tau_k$ rises, the growth rates of $K_t$ and $C_t$ decrease compared with the case of $\Delta \tau = 0$. On the contrary, the effects of increases in $\tau_n$ or $\tau_c$ on the growth rates of $K_t$ and $C_t$ are sufficiently small. Regarding the initial jump in private consumption, the effect of an increase in $\tau_k$ on $C_0$ is sufficiently small. However, when $\tau_n$ or $\tau_c$ increases, $C_0$ decreases. For all taxes, the effects of tax increases on $n_t$ are sufficiently small.

Table 6 represents the welfare effects under the deficit policy rule with tax increases. It shows that the welfare gains of reductions in $\bar{d}$ based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts are larger than those with $\tau_k$ or $\tau_n$ increases. Furthermore, Table 6 shows that when $\tau_k$ increases, welfare declines and that sufficiently low $\phi$ and sufficiently large $\tau_n$ increases lead to welfare losses. From Figure 4, when $\tau_k$ increases, the growth rate of $C_t$ falls compared with the case of $\Delta \tau = 0$. This has a sufficiently large negative welfare effect. When $\tau_n$ increases, $C_0$ decreases, which has a sufficiently large negative welfare effect. By contrast, Table 6 shows that sufficiently small (large) $\tau_c$ increases generate larger (smaller) welfare gains. From Figure 4, when $\tau_c$ increases, the growth rate of $C_t$ rises compared with the case of $\Delta \tau = 0$ (this is a positive welfare effect) and $C_0$ decreases (this is a negative welfare effect). Therefore, when $\tau_c$ increases are sufficiently small (large), the positive welfare effect exceeds (falls short of) the negative welfare effect. Although sufficiently small $\tau_c$ increases can generate larger welfare gains, these welfare gains are sufficiently small compared with the welfare gains under the debt policy rule.
7 Welfare effects with transfer payment reductions

Similarly to the analyses of Section 6, we now consider the welfare effects with transfer payment reductions. Under the debt (deficit) policy rule, we consider the following scenario. The economy is initially in the steady state described in Section 4.3 (5.3). At time 0, the government reduces $\bar{z} (\bar{d})$ and $\xi$ unexpectedly. After this policy change, the value of $\xi$ remains unchanged. Note that if transfer payment reductions are not sufficient to pursue fiscal consolidation, the government reduces its expenditure. The new target of $\bar{z} (\bar{d})$ is set to 0.6 (0.01467) and the value of $\phi$ is set to 0.05.

7.1 Debt policy rule

Figure 5 shows the results of the transitional paths under the debt policy rule with transfer payment decreases. Here, $\Delta \xi$ denotes changes in $\xi$. Although reductions in transfer payment create fiscal space for the government, they tighten the budget constraint of households. Therefore, compared with the case of $\Delta \xi = 0$, a decrease in $\xi$ raises $I_{g,t}/Y_t$ and reduces $C_t/K_t$ in the short and long run. The transitional path of $n_t$ begins to run in the opposite direction of $C_t/K_t$; that is, $n_t$ increases during transitional paths. Further, a higher $I_{g,t}/Y_t$ implies higher growth rates of $K_t$ and $C_t$.

Table 7 represents the welfare effects under the debt policy rule with transfer payment decreases. It shows that the welfare gains of reductions in $\bar{z}$ with transfer payment decreases are larger than those based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts. From Figure 5, compared with the case of $\Delta \xi = 0$, reductions in $\xi$ have negative welfare effects by reducing $C_0$ and increasing $n_t$ and have positive welfare effects by increasing the growth rate of $C_t$. From Table 7, the positive welfare effects exceed the negative welfare effects.

7.2 Deficit policy rule

In this subsection, we examine the welfare effects under the deficit policy rule with transfer payment decreases. Figure 6 presents the results of the transitional paths. The effects of reductions in transfer payment are similar to those under the debt policy rule. Compared with
the case of $\Delta \xi = 0$, reductions in transfer payment raise $I_{g,t}/Y_t$, $n_t$, and the growth rates of $K_t$ and $C_t$ and reduce $C_t/K_t$ during the transitional paths.

[Figure 6]

Table 8 represents the welfare effects under the deficit policy rule with transfer payment decreases. Similarly to the debt policy rule, the welfare gains of reductions in $d$ with transfer payment decreases are larger than those based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts. From Figure 6, compared with the case of $\Delta \xi = 0$, reductions in $\xi$ have negative welfare effects by reducing $C_{0}$ and increasing $n_{t}$ and have positive welfare effects by increasing the growth rate of $C_{t}$. From Table 8, the positive welfare effects exceed the negative welfare effects.

[Table 8]

8 Discussion

8.1 Changes in new targets

The results presented thus far show that the welfare gains under the debt policy rule are larger than those under the deficit policy rule. This result may depend on the new target of $\bar{z}$ or $\bar{d}$. Therefore, in this subsection, we investigate the welfare effects of changes in $\bar{z}$ and $\bar{d}$.

First, we consider the debt policy rule. The parameter values are the same as in Section 4.3 and the scenario is the same as in Section 4.4. We set $\phi$ to 0.05 and vary the new targets of $\bar{z}$: 0.2, 0.6, 1, and 1.4. Figure 7 presents the transitional paths and Table 9 shows the results of our welfare analysis. As shown in Figure 7, a lower value of $\bar{z}$ implies the following results: (i) the increase in $C_{0}$ is larger, (ii) the short-run growth rate of $C_t$ is lower and the long-run growth rate of $C_t$ is higher, and (iii) the short-run value of $n_t$ is lower and the long-run value of $n_t$ is higher. From Table 9, for lower values of $\bar{z}$, the welfare gains are larger; that is, the positive welfare effects are larger.

[Figure 7 and Table 9]

Next, we consider the deficit policy rule. The parameter values are the same as in Section 5.3 and the scenario is the same as in Section 5.4. We set $\phi$ to 0.05 and vary the new targets of $\bar{d}$: 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, and 0.04. Figure 8 presents the transitional paths and Table 10 shows the
results of our welfare analysis. From Figure 8, a lower value of $\bar{d}$ implies the following results: (i) the increase in $C_0$ is larger, (ii) the short-run growth rate of $C_t$ is lower and the long-run growth rate of $C_t$ is higher, and (iii) the short-run value of $n_t$ is lower and the long-run value of $n_t$ is higher. From Table 10, for lower values of $\bar{d}$, the welfare gains are larger; that is, the positive welfare effects are larger. However, as shown in Tables 9 and 10, the welfare gains under the deficit policy rule are sufficiently small compared with those under the debt policy rule even if we change the new targets of $\bar{z}$ and $\bar{d}$.

[Figure 8 and Table 10]

### 8.2 Government consumption into utility

In this subsection, we incorporate government consumption into utility. Following Maebayashi et al. (2017), we modify the utility function (2) as follows:

$$U_0 = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( \log C_t - \psi \frac{n_t^{1+\chi}}{1+\chi} + \eta \log C_{g,t} \right) dt,$$

(34)

where $C_{g,t}$ is the government consumption expenditure; that is, $C_{g,t} = (1-\theta)G_t$ holds. $\eta$ represents households’ preference for government consumption. As mentioned by Maebayashi et al. (2017), to avoid equilibrium indeterminacy, we employ a separable utility function for $C_t$ and $C_{g,t}$. Under this modification, the results of the transitional dynamics remain unchanged.

Hence, when we consider the debt (deficit) policy rule, we employ the same parameter values as in Section 4.3 (5.3). The welfare gains or losses of the policy change are measured by $\Delta U_0 \equiv (U_0^{**} - U_{ini}^*)/|U_{ini}^*|$, where $U_0^{**}$ is defined as the welfare level after the policy change.\(^{14}\)

By using the same scenario as in Section 4.5, Table 11 presents the results of our welfare analysis under the debt policy rule based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts. In Table 11, we set the new target of $\bar{z}$ to 0.6, vary the values of $\phi \in \{0.01, 0.05, 0.1\}$, and vary the values of $\eta \in \{0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1\}$. As shown in Table 11, the main results presented in Section 4.5 remain unchanged; that is, reductions in $\bar{z}$ improve welfare and the welfare gains increase as $\phi$ rises.

[Table 11]

---

\(^{14}\)In Appendix A, we present the calculation procedure for $U_0^{**}$ under the relaxation algorithm developed by Trimborn et al. (2008).
By using the same scenario as in Section 5.5, Table 12 presents the results of our welfare analysis under the deficit policy rule based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts. In Table 12, we set the new target of \( \bar{d} \) to 0.01467, vary the values of \( \phi \in \{0.01, 0.05, 0.1\} \), and vary the values of \( \eta \in \{0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1\} \). Table 12 shows that the main results in Section 5.5 remain unchanged. That is, reductions in \( \bar{d} \) improve welfare and the welfare gains increase as \( \phi \) rises. From Tables 11 and 12, even for the utility function (34), the welfare gains under the debt policy rule are sufficiently large compared with those under the deficit policy rule.

[Table 12]

Tables 11 and 12 show that an increase in \( \eta \) reduces the welfare gains under the debt and deficit policy rules. From \( I_{g,t} = \theta G_t \), \( C_{g,t} = (1 - \theta)G_t \), and the results of Figures 1 and 2, when fiscal consolidation is implemented, \( C_{g,t} \) declines in the short run, which diminishes welfare. A higher \( \eta \) implies that this negative welfare effect becomes larger. As shown in Figures 3–6, tax increases or reductions in transfer payment mitigate the short-run decline in \( C_{g,t} \) under the debt policy rule and raise \( C_{g,t} \) under the deficit policy rule. Therefore, fiscal consolidation with tax increases or transfer payment reductions might generate larger welfare gains as \( \eta \) increases. To discuss this, we examine the welfare effects under the debt and deficit policy rules with either tax increases or transfer payment decreases, or both. Under the debt (deficit) policy rule, we consider the following scenario. The economy is initially in the steady state described in Section 4.3 (5.3). At time 0, the government reduces \( \bar{z} \) (\( \bar{d} \)) and \( \xi \) and raises only one tax rate unexpectedly. After this policy change, the tax rate and value of \( \xi \) remain unchanged. The new target of \( \bar{z} \) (\( \bar{d} \)) is set to 0.6 (0.01467) and the value of \( \phi \) is set to 0.05. Table 13 (14) presents the case of \( \eta = 0 \) under the debt (deficit) policy rule. When \( \eta = 0 \), the welfare gains under the debt policy rule with transfer payment reductions are the largest.

[Tables 13 and 14]

We then consider a sufficiently low value of \( \eta \). Table 15 (16) presents the case of \( \eta = 0.01 \) under the debt (deficit) policy rule. Similarly to the case of \( \eta = 0 \), the welfare gains under the debt policy rule with transfer payment reductions are the largest.

[Tables 15 and 16]
At the end of this subsection, we consider a sufficiently high value of $\eta$. Table 17 (18) presents the case of $\eta = 0.1$ under the debt (deficit) policy rule. In this case, not only fiscal consolidation with reductions in transfer payment but also fiscal consolidation with increases in labor income or consumption taxes generates larger welfare gains. By comparison, fiscal consolidation with increases in consumption tax generates larger welfare gains than that with increases in labor income tax. In summary, the welfare gains under the debt policy rule with both consumption tax increases and transfer payment reductions are the largest.

[Tables 17 and 18]

9 Conclusion

In this study, we constructed an endogenous growth model with public capital and endogenous labor supply and investigated quantitatively the welfare effects of fiscal consolidation by using Japanese data. We found that fiscal consolidation under the debt and deficit policy rules based only on government consumption and investment expenditure cuts improves welfare. A higher speed of fiscal consolidation implies a larger welfare improvement. Lowering the target debt-to-GDP or deficit-to-GDP ratio generates larger welfare gains. Further, the welfare gains under the debt policy rule are larger than those under the deficit policy rule. When we incorporate government consumption utility, the results of our welfare analyses can be summarized as follows. If households’ preference for government consumption is sufficiently low, fiscal consolidation under the debt policy rule with transfer payment reductions is appropriate for improving welfare. On the contrary, if households’ preference for government consumption is sufficiently high, fiscal consolidation under the debt policy rule with both consumption tax increases and transfer payment reductions is appropriate for improving welfare.

There are several interesting directions for future research. First, as mentioned in Section 4.3, our calibration result shows that the steady-state values of the total tax revenue-to-GDP ratio and government interest payments-to-GDP ratio do not match the Japanese data. Because these factors may be important in our welfare analysis, future research should address this point. Second, Japan is facing a declining birthrate and aging population. Therefore, incorporating intergenerational conflicts could provide interesting insights into fiscal consolidation. Third, we assume that the ratio of government investment to the sum of government consumption and government investment is constant. Owing to population aging, it may be difficult for the Japanese government to cut its consumption expenditure. Hence, investigating the welfare
effects of fiscal consolidation with changes in the ratio of government investment to the sum of government consumption and government investment would be an important direction for future research.

Appendix

A Calculation of $U_{0}^{**}$ and $U_{0}^{***}$

Following Maebayashi et al. (2017), we calculate the value of $U_{0}^{**}$. Let us define $U_{t} = \int_{t}^{\infty} e^{-\rho(s-t)} \left( \log C_{s} - \psi \frac{n_{s}^{1+\chi}}{1+\chi} \right) ds$ and $X_{t} = U_{t} - \frac{1}{\rho} \log K_{t}$. By differentiating $X_{t}$ with respect to $t$ and using (12) and $c_{t} = C_{t}/K_{t}$, we obtain

$$X_{t} = \rho X_{t} - \log c_{t} + \psi \frac{n_{t}^{1+\chi}}{1+\chi} - \frac{1}{\rho} \left( Ak_{g,t}^{\beta} n_{t}^{1-\alpha} - c_{t} - g_{t} - \delta_{k} \right).$$

In the steady state, $X_{t}$ becomes

$$X^{*} = \frac{1}{\rho} \left[ \log c^{*} - \psi \frac{(n^{*})^{1+\chi}}{1+\chi} \right] + \frac{1}{\rho^{2}} \left[ A(k_{g}^{*})^{\beta} (n^{*})^{1-\alpha} - c^{*} - g^{*} - \delta_{k} \right].$$

Thus, by using the relaxation algorithm, we can calculate the dynamic path of $X_{t}$. As in Section 4.5, we set $K_{0} = 1$, and hence, $X_{0} = U_{0}$ holds. From these results, we obtain the value of $U_{0}^{**}$.

Next, we explain the calculation method under the utility function (34). Let us define $X_{g,t}$ as $X_{g,t} = \int_{t}^{\infty} e^{-\rho(s-t)} \eta \log C_{g,s} ds - \frac{2}{\rho} \log K_{t}$. By using $C_{g,t} = (1-\theta)g_{t}K_{t}$, we obtain

$$X_{g,t} = \rho X_{g,t} - \eta \log g_{t} - \frac{\eta}{\rho} \left( Ak_{g,t}^{\beta} n_{t}^{1-\alpha} - c_{t} - g_{t} - \delta_{k} \right) - \eta \log(1-\theta).$$

In the steady state, $X_{g,t}$ becomes

$$X_{g}^{*} = \frac{\eta}{\rho} \log g^{*} + \frac{\eta}{\rho^{2}} \left[ A(k_{g}^{*})^{\beta} (n^{*})^{1-\alpha} - c^{*} - g^{*} - \delta_{k} \right] + \frac{\eta}{\rho} \log(1-\theta).$$

Thus, by using the relaxation algorithm, we can calculate the dynamic path of $X_{g,t}$. Because we set $K_{0} = 1$, we obtain the value of $U_{0}^{***} = X_{0} + X_{g,0}$. 

28
References


Table 1: Parameter values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.3783</td>
<td>Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>1.5376</td>
<td>Calibrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon$</td>
<td>0.2574</td>
<td>Calibrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chetty et al. (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.02824</td>
<td>Calibrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>100.01</td>
<td>Calibrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>0.2320</td>
<td>Data average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>0.1469</td>
<td>Calibrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_k$</td>
<td>0.5189</td>
<td>Gunji and Miyazaki (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_b$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_n$</td>
<td>0.3324</td>
<td>Gunji and Miyazaki (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_c$</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_k$</td>
<td>0.0721</td>
<td>Set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_g$</td>
<td>0.0448</td>
<td>Kato (2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Data and solutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private consumption-to-GDP</td>
<td>0.5461</td>
<td>0.5832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government budget deficit-to-GDP</td>
<td>0.04208</td>
<td>0.04521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tax revenue-to-GDP</td>
<td>0.2699</td>
<td>0.3949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government interest payments-to-GDP</td>
<td>0.0287</td>
<td>0.1339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Economic Outlook.

Note: The data averages of the private consumption-to-GDP ratio, government budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, total tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, and government interest payments-to-GDP ratio are for 1980–2015.
\[ \phi = 0.01 \quad \phi = 0.05 \quad \phi = 0.1 \]
\[ \Delta U_0 \quad 1.811\% \quad 7.244\% \quad 11.941\% \]

Table 3: Welfare gains (losses) based only on expenditure cuts: The debt policy rule.

\[ \phi = 0.01 \quad \phi = 0.05 \quad \phi = 0.1 \]
\[ \Delta U_0 \quad 0.092\% \quad 0.447\% \quad 0.814\% \]

Table 4: Welfare gains (losses) based only on expenditure cuts: The deficit policy rule.

\[ \Delta U_0 \quad \text{no tax change} \quad 1.811\% \quad 7.244\% \quad 11.941\% \]
\[ \Delta \tau_k = 0.01 \quad -1.482\% \quad 3.935\% \quad 8.625\% \]
\[ \Delta \tau_k = 0.02 \quad -4.813\% \quad 0.589\% \quad 5.272\% \]
\[ \Delta \tau_k = 0.03 \quad -8.182\% \quad -2.795\% \quad 1.881\% \]
\[ \Delta \tau_n = 0.01 \quad 1.426\% \quad 6.903\% \quad 11.632\% \]
\[ \Delta \tau_n = 0.02 \quad 0.995\% \quad 6.518\% \quad 11.278\% \]
\[ \Delta \tau_n = 0.03 \quad 0.518\% \quad 6.089\% \quad 10.882\% \]
\[ \Delta \tau_c = 0.01 \quad 1.799\% \quad 7.226\% \quad 11.923\% \]
\[ \Delta \tau_c = 0.02 \quad 1.758\% \quad 7.181\% \quad 11.878\% \]
\[ \Delta \tau_c = 0.03 \quad 1.689\% \quad 7.108\% \quad 11.806\% \]

Table 5: Welfare gains (losses) with tax increases: The debt policy rule.
\[
\phi = 0.01 \quad \phi = 0.05 \quad \phi = 0.1
\]
\[
\begin{array}{l|lll}
\Delta U_0 & \text{no tax change} & 0.092\% & 0.447\% & 0.814\% \\
\Delta \tau_k = 0.01 & -3.420\% & -3.060\% & -2.691\% \\
\Delta \tau_k = 0.02 & -6.972\% & -6.607\% & -6.236\% \\
\Delta \tau_k = 0.03 & -10.564\% & -10.195\% & -9.821\% \\
\Delta \tau_n = 0.01 & -0.290\% & 0.069\% & 0.439\% \\
\Delta \tau_n = 0.02 & -0.718\% & -0.356\% & 0.019\% \\
\Delta \tau_n = 0.03 & -1.194\% & -0.827\% & -0.447\% \\
\Delta \tau_c = 0.01 & 0.118\% & 0.469\% & 0.834\% \\
\Delta \tau_c = 0.02 & 0.112\% & 0.460\% & 0.823\% \\
\Delta \tau_c = 0.03 & 0.078\% & 0.424\% & 0.784\%
\end{array}
\]

Table 6: Welfare gains (losses) with tax increases: The deficit policy rule.

\[
\phi = 0.01 \quad \phi = 0.05 \quad \phi = 0.1
\]
\[
\begin{array}{l|lll}
\Delta U_0 & \Delta \xi = 0 & 1.811\% & 7.244\% & 11.941\% \\
\Delta \xi = -0.01 & 2.564\% & 8.023\% & 12.740\% \\
\Delta \xi = -0.02 & 3.293\% & 8.780\% & 13.515\% \\
\Delta \xi = -0.03 & 3.998\% & 9.514\% & 14.269\%
\end{array}
\]

Table 7: Welfare gains (losses) with transfer payment decreases: The debt policy rule.

\[
\phi = 0.01 \quad \phi = 0.05 \quad \phi = 0.1
\]
\[
\begin{array}{l|lll}
\Delta U_0 & \Delta \xi = 0 & 0.092\% & 0.447\% & 0.814\% \\
\Delta \xi = -0.01 & 0.909\% & 1.265\% & 1.634\% \\
\Delta \xi = -0.02 & 1.703\% & 2.059\% & 2.431\% \\
\Delta \xi = -0.03 & 2.474\% & 2.832\% & 3.206\%
\end{array}
\]

Table 8: Welfare gains (losses) with transfer payment decreases: The deficit policy rule.
\( \bar{z} = 0.2 \quad \bar{z} = 0.6 \quad \bar{z} = 1 \quad \bar{z} = 1.4 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \Delta U_0 )</th>
<th>8.872%</th>
<th>7.244%</th>
<th>5.534%</th>
<th>3.746%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 9: Welfare gains (losses) based only on expenditure cuts under each value of \( \bar{z} \): The debt policy rule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \bar{d} = 0.01 )</th>
<th>( \bar{d} = 0.02 )</th>
<th>( \bar{d} = 0.03 )</th>
<th>( \bar{d} = 0.04 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta U_0 )</td>
<td>0.502%</td>
<td>0.379%</td>
<td>0.238%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Welfare gains (losses) based only on expenditure cuts under each value of \( \bar{d} \): The deficit policy rule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \phi = 0.01 )</th>
<th>( \phi = 0.05 )</th>
<th>( \phi = 0.1 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta U_0 )</td>
<td>( \eta = 0 )</td>
<td>1.811%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \eta = 0.01 )</td>
<td>1.796%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \eta = 0.05 )</td>
<td>1.742%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \eta = 0.1 )</td>
<td>1.685%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Welfare gains (losses) based only on expenditure cuts under government consumption utility: The debt policy rule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \phi = 0.01 )</th>
<th>( \phi = 0.05 )</th>
<th>( \phi = 0.1 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta U_0 )</td>
<td>( \eta = 0 )</td>
<td>0.0922%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \eta = 0.01 )</td>
<td>0.0910%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \eta = 0.05 )</td>
<td>0.0866%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \eta = 0.1 )</td>
<td>0.0820%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Welfare gains (losses) based only on expenditure cuts under government consumption utility: The deficit policy rule.
\[
\Delta \xi = 0 \quad \Delta \xi = -0.01 \quad \Delta \xi = -0.02 \quad \Delta \xi = -0.03
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(\Delta U_0)</th>
<th>no tax change</th>
<th>(\Delta \xi = 0)</th>
<th>(\Delta \xi = -0.01)</th>
<th>(\Delta \xi = -0.02)</th>
<th>(\Delta \xi = -0.03)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_k = 0.01)</td>
<td>3.935%</td>
<td>4.672%</td>
<td>5.386%</td>
<td>6.078%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_k = 0.02)</td>
<td>0.589%</td>
<td>1.283%</td>
<td>1.955%</td>
<td>2.605%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_k = 0.03)</td>
<td>-2.795%</td>
<td>-2.143%</td>
<td>-1.513%</td>
<td>-0.904%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_n = 0.01)</td>
<td>6.903%</td>
<td>7.659%</td>
<td>8.392%</td>
<td>9.104%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_n = 0.02)</td>
<td>6.518%</td>
<td>7.251%</td>
<td>7.962%</td>
<td>8.653%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_n = 0.03)</td>
<td>6.089%</td>
<td>6.800%</td>
<td>7.490%</td>
<td>8.159%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_c = 0.01)</td>
<td>7.226%</td>
<td>7.976%</td>
<td>8.704%</td>
<td>9.411%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_c = 0.02)</td>
<td>7.181%</td>
<td>7.902%</td>
<td>8.603%</td>
<td>9.284%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_c = 0.03)</td>
<td>7.108%</td>
<td>7.804%</td>
<td>8.479%</td>
<td>9.135%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Welfare gains (losses) with tax increases and transfer payment decreases under government consumption utility: The debt policy rule. (\(\eta = 0\))

\[
\Delta \xi = 0 \quad \Delta \xi = -0.01 \quad \Delta \xi = -0.02 \quad \Delta \xi = -0.03
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(\Delta U_0)</th>
<th>no tax change</th>
<th>(\Delta \xi = 0)</th>
<th>(\Delta \xi = -0.01)</th>
<th>(\Delta \xi = -0.02)</th>
<th>(\Delta \xi = -0.03)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_k = 0.01)</td>
<td>-3.060%</td>
<td>-2.288%</td>
<td>-1.538%</td>
<td>-0.809%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_k = 0.02)</td>
<td>-6.607%</td>
<td>-5.880%</td>
<td>-5.174%</td>
<td>-4.489%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_k = 0.03)</td>
<td>-10.195%</td>
<td>-9.511%</td>
<td>-8.850%</td>
<td>-8.209%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_n = 0.01)</td>
<td>0.069%</td>
<td>0.862%</td>
<td>1.634%</td>
<td>2.385%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_n = 0.02)</td>
<td>-0.356%</td>
<td>0.415%</td>
<td>1.164%</td>
<td>1.894%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_n = 0.03)</td>
<td>-0.827%</td>
<td>-0.078%</td>
<td>0.650%</td>
<td>1.359%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_c = 0.01)</td>
<td>0.469%</td>
<td>1.256%</td>
<td>2.021%</td>
<td>2.765%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_c = 0.02)</td>
<td>0.460%</td>
<td>1.218%</td>
<td>1.956%</td>
<td>2.673%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \tau_c = 0.03)</td>
<td>0.424%</td>
<td>1.154%</td>
<td>1.865%</td>
<td>2.557%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Welfare gains (losses) with tax increases and transfer payment decreases under government consumption utility: The deficit policy rule. (\(\eta = 0\))
\[ \Delta \xi = 0 \quad \Delta \xi = -0.01 \quad \Delta \xi = -0.02 \quad \Delta \xi = -0.03 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta U_0$</th>
<th>no tax change</th>
<th>7.169%</th>
<th>7.990%</th>
<th>8.788%</th>
<th>9.563%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.01$</td>
<td>3.916%</td>
<td>4.695%</td>
<td>5.450%</td>
<td>6.184%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.02$</td>
<td>0.626%</td>
<td>1.363%</td>
<td>2.076%</td>
<td>2.768%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.03$</td>
<td>-2.701%</td>
<td>-2.007%</td>
<td>-1.335%</td>
<td>-0.684%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.01$</td>
<td>6.877%</td>
<td>7.674%</td>
<td>8.448%</td>
<td>9.200%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.02$</td>
<td>6.540%</td>
<td>7.314%</td>
<td>8.065%</td>
<td>8.796%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.03$</td>
<td>6.159%</td>
<td>6.910%</td>
<td>7.640%</td>
<td>8.349%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.01$</td>
<td>7.195%</td>
<td>7.986%</td>
<td>8.754%</td>
<td>9.501%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.02$</td>
<td>7.191%</td>
<td>7.953%</td>
<td>8.693%</td>
<td>9.413%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.03$</td>
<td>7.159%</td>
<td>7.894%</td>
<td>8.609%</td>
<td>9.303%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: Welfare gains (losses) with tax increases and transfer payment decreases under government consumption utility: The debt policy rule. ($\eta = 0.01$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta U_0$</th>
<th>no tax change</th>
<th>0.441%</th>
<th>1.299%</th>
<th>2.134%</th>
<th>2.946%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.01$</td>
<td>-3.009%</td>
<td>-2.196%</td>
<td>-1.405%</td>
<td>-0.637%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.02$</td>
<td>-6.498%</td>
<td>-5.729%</td>
<td>-4.983%</td>
<td>-4.258%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.03$</td>
<td>-10.027%</td>
<td>-9.303%</td>
<td>-8.600%</td>
<td>-7.919%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.01$</td>
<td>0.110%</td>
<td>0.944%</td>
<td>1.756%</td>
<td>2.546%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.02$</td>
<td>-0.266%</td>
<td>0.544%</td>
<td>1.333%</td>
<td>2.101%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.03$</td>
<td>-0.689%</td>
<td>0.099%</td>
<td>0.866%</td>
<td>1.614%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.01$</td>
<td>0.505%</td>
<td>1.332%</td>
<td>2.136%</td>
<td>2.920%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.02$</td>
<td>0.538%</td>
<td>1.335%</td>
<td>2.111%</td>
<td>2.867%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.03$</td>
<td>0.542%</td>
<td>1.310%</td>
<td>2.059%</td>
<td>2.789%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Welfare gains (losses) with tax increases and transfer payment decreases under government consumption utility: The deficit policy rule. ($\eta = 0.01$)
### Table 17: Welfare gains (losses) with tax increases and transfer payment decreases under government consumption utility: The debt policy rule. ($\eta = 0.1$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta U_0$</th>
<th>$\Delta \xi = 0$</th>
<th>$\Delta \xi = -0.01$</th>
<th>$\Delta \xi = -0.02$</th>
<th>$\Delta \xi = -0.03$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no tax change</td>
<td>6.621%</td>
<td>7.749%</td>
<td>8.849%</td>
<td>9.922%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.01$</td>
<td>3.778%</td>
<td>4.865%</td>
<td>5.924%</td>
<td>6.957%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.02$</td>
<td>0.901%</td>
<td>1.946%</td>
<td>2.965%</td>
<td>3.957%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.03$</td>
<td>-2.011%</td>
<td>-1.007%</td>
<td>-0.029%</td>
<td>0.924%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.01$</td>
<td>6.684%</td>
<td>7.784%</td>
<td>8.857%</td>
<td>9.904%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.02$</td>
<td>6.700%</td>
<td>7.773%</td>
<td>8.820%</td>
<td>9.843%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.03$</td>
<td>6.670%</td>
<td>7.717%</td>
<td>8.740%</td>
<td>9.739%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.01$</td>
<td>6.962%</td>
<td>8.053%</td>
<td>9.118%</td>
<td>10.157%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.02$</td>
<td>7.266%</td>
<td>8.322%</td>
<td>9.352%</td>
<td>10.360%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.03$</td>
<td>7.534%</td>
<td>8.557%</td>
<td>9.556%</td>
<td>10.533%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 18: Welfare gains (losses) with tax increases and transfer payment decreases under government consumption utility: The deficit policy rule. ($\eta = 0.1$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta U_0$</th>
<th>$\Delta \xi = 0$</th>
<th>$\Delta \xi = -0.01$</th>
<th>$\Delta \xi = -0.02$</th>
<th>$\Delta \xi = -0.03$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no tax change</td>
<td>0.394%</td>
<td>1.551%</td>
<td>2.680%</td>
<td>3.783%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.01$</td>
<td>-2.635%</td>
<td>-1.522%</td>
<td>-0.435%</td>
<td>0.625%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.02$</td>
<td>-5.700%</td>
<td>-4.630%</td>
<td>-3.587%</td>
<td>-2.568%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_k = 0.03$</td>
<td>-8.803%</td>
<td>-7.775%</td>
<td>-6.774%</td>
<td>-5.797%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.01$</td>
<td>0.416%</td>
<td>1.545%</td>
<td>2.647%</td>
<td>3.725%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.02$</td>
<td>0.390%</td>
<td>1.492%</td>
<td>2.569%</td>
<td>3.622%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_n = 0.03$</td>
<td>0.317%</td>
<td>1.393%</td>
<td>2.445%</td>
<td>3.476%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.01$</td>
<td>0.769%</td>
<td>1.888%</td>
<td>2.981%</td>
<td>4.049%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.02$</td>
<td>1.105%</td>
<td>2.188%</td>
<td>3.247%</td>
<td>4.283%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \tau_c = 0.03$</td>
<td>1.404%</td>
<td>2.453%</td>
<td>3.480%</td>
<td>4.485%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Transition dynamics based only on expenditure cuts: The debt policy rule.

*Note:* The circle at the left end represents the initial steady-state value and the cross at the right end represents the new steady-state value.
Figure 2: Transition dynamics based only on expenditure cuts: The deficit policy rule.

Note: The circle at the left end represents the initial steady-state value and the cross at the right end represents the new steady-state value.
Figure 3: Transition dynamics with tax increases: The debt policy rule.

Note: The circle at the left end represents the initial steady-state value.
Figure 4: Transition dynamics with tax increases: The deficit policy rule.

*Note:* The circle at the left end represents the initial steady-state value.
Figure 5: Transition dynamics with transfer payment decreases: The debt policy rule.

Note: The circle at the left end represents the initial steady-state value.
Figure 6: Transition dynamics with transfer payment decreases: The deficit policy rule.

*Note:* The circle at the left end represents the initial steady-state value.
Figure 7: Transition dynamics of changes in $\bar{z}$.

Note: The circle at the left end represents the initial steady-state value.
Figure 8: Transition dynamics of changes in $\bar{d}$.

*Note:* The circle at the left end represents the initial steady-state value.